ENFORCING THE AVENA DECISION IN U.S. COURTS
CURTIS A. BRADLEY*

The Avena decision1 concerned Article 36 of the Vienna Con‐
vention on Consular Relations, a treaty that the United States
ratified in 1969.2 Article 36 provides that a party country that
arrests a national from another party country is required to ad‐
vise the national that he can communicate with and seek assis‐
tance from his consulate.3 An Optional Protocol to this Conven‐
tion, which the United States also ratified in 1969 but recently
withdrew from, provides that the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) at The Hague has jurisdiction to hear disputes “arising
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention.”4
The ICJ has heard several cases involving violations of Arti‐
cle 36 by the United States: the Breard case brought by Para‐
guay,5 the LaGrand case brought by Germany,6 and most re‐
cently the Avena case brought by Mexico.7 In its Avena decision,
the ICJ held that Article 36 confers individual rights, that the
United States violated those rights with respect to fifty‐one
Mexican nationals, and that, as a remedy for these violations, in
cases involving severe penalties, the United States was re‐
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1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. Id. at 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292–94.
4. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concern‐
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 324, 596
U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. The United States withdrew from the
Optional Protocol in 2005. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State,
to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary‐General (Mar. 7, 2005), http://untreaty.un.org/Eng‐
lish/CNs/2005/101_200/186E.doc.
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr.
9).
6. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
7. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
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quired to provide the Mexican nationals with review and re‐
consideration of their convictions and sentences, notwithstand‐
ing any rules of procedural default that might otherwise bar
such review and reconsideration.8 The domestic effect of this
decision is currently being litigated, both in cases involving the
Mexican nationals directly discussed in the Avena decision, and
in cases involving foreign nationals not directly covered by the
decision but with respect to whom the Vienna Convention was
violated.9
This Article makes three points: First, even though the Avena
decision is binding on the United States internationally, the
United States legal system should not give direct effect to the
decision. Second, the general concept of “comity” does not
provide a basis for automatically accepting the ICJ’s treaty in‐
terpretation in Avena. Third, it may nevertheless be appropriate
for United States courts to give some deference to the ICJ’s
treaty interpretation to the extent that the treaty is ambiguous
and the ICJ’s interpretation is reasonable. I will then describe
what I believe the implications of these three points are for cur‐
rent litigation in the United States concerning violations of the
Vienna Convention.
My first argument is that the United States legal system
should not give direct effect to the ICJ’s decision in Avena—or,
indeed, to any ICJ decision. That an international tribunal’s de‐
cision is binding on the United States does not reveal anything
about the domestic legal status of the decision. Both the United
States and the international community have consistently re‐
garded international obligations and domestic implementation
as separate questions. The ICJ itself has stated in its Vienna
Convention decisions, including Avena, that the United States
could implement the decisions “by means of its own choos‐
ing.”10
Those who advocate giving the Avena decision direct effect
would allow the decision to override otherwise applicable state
law and state judicial decisions.11 In other words, the advocates

8. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 64–67.
9. See Sanchez‐Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006); see also Ex Parte Medel‐
lin, No. AP‐75207, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006).
10. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 60–63; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 516.
11. See, e.g., Linda E. Carter, Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and
Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 259 (2005) (discussing, in general, how the United States
should implement the Avena decision).
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are arguing that the decision should be given the status in the
United States of preemptive federal law.12 The Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, however, states that there are
only three types of supreme federal law: federal statutes, trea‐
ties, and the Constitution itself.13 Thus international judicial
decisions are not themselves supreme federal law under our
Constitution.
There is nothing in the United States treaty relationship with
the ICJ that suggests that ICJ decisions will have direct domes‐
tic legal effect. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that “[t]he
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.”14 In addition, the
United Nations Charter simply provides that nations “under‐
tak[e] to comply” with decisions of the ICJ to which they are a
party, with no suggestion of any automatic judicial enforceabil‐
ity.15 Furthermore, the only mechanism for enforcing ICJ deci‐
sions that the Charter provides is enforcement through the
United Nations Security Council.16
If the United States legal system were to give direct effect to
the Avena decision, this action would raise several constitu‐
tional concerns. First, ICJ judges are not subject to the ap‐
pointment and life tenure provisions set forth for the federal
judiciary in Article III of the Constitution, making it problem‐
atic to vest ICJ judges with the authority to displace United
States laws and decisions directly.17 In addition, because the
Avena decision would override state criminal laws and proce‐
dures—matters that the Supreme Court has said are an impor‐
tant part of state sovereignty18—such direct effectuation would
12. See, e.g., id. at 276–77 (discussing different approaches that the United States
legal system could take to implement the Avena decision).
13. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
14. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1062, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter Statute].
15. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
16. Id. at para. 2.
17. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges shall hold
their offices “during good Behaviour”), with Statute, supra note 14, at art. 3 and
art. 4 (providing that the ICJ be comprised of fifteen judges who are elected by the
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council).
18. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (holding that an
adequate state procedural ground can bar federal review of a constitutional
claim).
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raise federalism concerns. Giving direct judicial effect to an in‐
ternational decision such as Avena would also undermine the
flexibility of the political branches in deciding whether and
how to comply with a particular ruling. Moreover, treating
cases such as Avena as domestic precedent could make the po‐
litical branches less willing to consent to international adjudica‐
tion in the future.
My second argument is that the concept of “comity” does not
warrant automatic acceptance by United States courts of the
ICJ’s reasoning in Avena. United States courts often provide
some “comity,” or respect to foreign decisions, and therefore
recognize and enforce them.19 A French contract judgment, for
example, may well be enforced in a federal court.20 Even
though courts in the United States often provide comity to for‐
eign legal decisions, there are a number of differences between
giving deference in that context and giving precedential effect
to an ICJ decision. The notion of comity stems from respect for
equivalent sovereign states and thus does not necessarily apply
to a state’s relationship with an international institution.21 More
importantly, when United States courts enforce foreign judg‐
ments as a matter of comity, they do so only for the actual par‐
ties to the judgment.22 The only parties to the Avena decision,
however, were the United States and Mexico, not the individu‐
als seeking to have that decision given direct effect. Relatedly,
when enforcing foreign judgments, United States courts do not
treat the foreign decisions as binding precedent in other cases
in the way advocated for the Avena decision.
Furthermore, existing United States laws, policies, and
precedents always condition comity. Those who seek to have
courts in the United States apply the Avena decision are seeking
to override these laws, policies, and precedents concerning, for

19. See, e.g., Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Indus., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1043
(D. Del. 1984) (“[A]n American court will under principles of international comity
recognize a judgment of a foreign nation if it is convinced that the parties in the
foreign court received fair treatment . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (requiring that a lower court en‐
force a French decision because of principles of comity).
21. 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 n.9 (2d ed. 2002).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 98 (1971) (“A valid
judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned.”).
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example, the procedural default doctrine.23 The argument for
comity also is weaker because the United States has withdrawn
from the Optional Protocol giving the ICJ jurisdiction over
these types of disputes.24 The United States’ withdrawal from
the Protocol creates less of an ongoing relationship with the
ICJ.
Nevertheless, it may be appropriate for United States courts
to give some deference to the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna
Convention when the United States is a party to an ICJ case.
Other things being equal, it is desirable to have a common un‐
derstanding of the meaning of a treaty, and when the United
States has consented to adjudication in an ongoing tribunal like
the ICJ, it arguably has delegated some interpretive authority
to the tribunal. The Supreme Court in Breard v. Greene noted
that it should give “respectful consideration to the interpreta‐
tion of an international treaty rendered by an international
court with jurisdiction to interpret such.”25
A possible analogy here is to Chevron deference in adminis‐
trative law, pursuant to which courts defer to certain statutory
interpretations by administrative agencies.26 Some might argue
that Chevron deference for ICJ decisions is too strong, given that
administrative agencies are subject to more procedural and in‐
stitutional restraints under United States law than is the ICJ. In
addition, the statement from Breard sounds weaker than Chev‐
ron deference.27 In any event, even strong Chevron deference is
appropriate only when the underlying law is unclear and the
decision is reasonable.
Applying these points to the ICJ’s decision in Avena leads to
the following conclusions. First, the decision itself is not di‐
rectly enforceable in U.S. courts: Avena does not operate like a
Supreme Court decision. Second, U.S. courts are not obligated
as a matter of comity to accept the ICJ’s reasoning in that deci‐
23. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (discussing the procedural
default rule in relation to the admissibility of inculpatory statements).
24. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N.
Secretary‐General, supra note 4.
25. 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
26. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649
(2000).
27. Compare Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (suggesting that the Court provide “respect‐
ful consideration” to treaty interpretation by an international court), with Chevron,
467 U.S. 837 (directing U.S. courts to defer to certain statutory interpretations by
U.S. administrative agencies).
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sion. Third, it may nevertheless be appropriate to provide some
deference to the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to the extent that the treaty is ambiguous and the
ICJ’s interpretation is reasonable. Fourth, applying this stan‐
dard might entail accepting the ICJ’s conclusion that Article 36
confers not only state rights but also individual rights: Article
36 does, after all, refer several times to the arrested national’s
“rights.”28 The Supreme Court in Breard stated that Article 36
“arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assis‐
tance following arrest,” so the Court seemed to recognize that
this could be a reasonable interpretation.29 Moreover, the ex‐
ecutive branch has not denied that the Vienna Convention is
self‐executing in the sense that it has some domestic effect
without the need for implementing legislation.30
Finally, however, the ICJ’s reasoning that the United States
cannot apply neutral rules of procedural default to bar claims
based on Article 36 is not a reasonable construction of the treaty
and should not be accepted. Article 36 itself recognizes that the
rights in the Convention “shall be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State.”31 Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Breard noted that there is a strong pre‐
sumption that the procedural rules of the forum state govern
the implementation of a treaty in that state.32
Rules of procedural default, which require both the timely
raising of claims and exhaustion of remedies, are fundamental
rules of criminal procedure in the United States.33 Indeed,
these rules can bar consideration of even the most basic consti‐
tutional claims, and thus it is very strange to say that these
rules are not applicable to a treaty claim. Under the ICJ’s rea‐
soning, however, even if a lawyer strategically avoided raising
a Vienna Convention violation in order to save it for later to
see how the trial and sentencing went, his client would be enti‐
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. 36.
29. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
30. See, e.g., Valerie Epps, Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela‐
tions: Time for Remedies, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 7–8 (2004)
(citing S. EXEC. REP. NO. 91‐9, app. at 2, 5 (1969)) (executive branch memorandum
regarding the implementation of the Vienna Convention that provided that the
treaty was entirely self‐executing and did not require any implementing legisla‐
tion)).
31. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. 36.
32. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
33. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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tled to review and reconsideration based on the treaty claim—
something disallowed for constitutional claims even under the
most liberal habeas corpus precedent of the Warren Court.34
Finally, overriding neutral state procedural default rules that
are not being used to discriminate against federal law raises
serious federalism concerns, which is another reason not to de‐
fer to the ICJ on this issue.

34. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).

